PP badge link to homepage The Palestine Police during the British Mandate

Intro Section 1
1914-1920
Section 2
1920-1922
Section 3
1923-1927
Section 4
1927-1929
Section 5
1930-1936
Section 6
1936-1939
Section 7
1937-1939
Section 8
1939-1943
Section 9
1943-1945
Section 10
1945-1946
Section 11
Jan-May 1947
Section 12
May-Nov 1947
Section 13
Dec 1947-April 1948
Section 14
Evacuation 1948
Stand Down
July 1948

 Section 5

Aftermath of the 1929 Riots

i. Aftermath of the 1929 Riots

ii. Re-organisation of the Palestine Police

iii. The Black Hand

iv. The 1933 Riots

v. The Arlosorrof Case and Creation of the Dog Section

vi. King George V's Silver Jubilee

vii. The Black Hand re-emerges

John Hope-Simpson

The Palestinian High Commissioner Lieutenant Colonel Sir John Robert Chancellor GCMG, GCVO, GBE, DSO helped write the Passfield White Paper restricting Jewish immigration. However, Prime Minister Ramsay McDonald interpreted the terms in such a way that Jewish immigration continued unabated.

The question of security in Palestine, which was better, army or air force, came to the fore again. The High Commissioner wanted the War Office in control of Paleestinian Security with military command transferred to GOC, Egypt, but the British Government kept the Air Ministry responsible for security in Palestine and Transjordan.

Herbert Layard Dowbiggin,Inspector General of the British Ceylon Police,to Palestine to advise on the re-organisation of the Police Force which had both failed to foresee the riots and to cope with them when they happened. (see Hansard 22 January 1930 vol 234 cc194-5)

Dowbiggin's advice,in a secret report published in May 1930, was to replace Commandant Mavrogordato and re-inforce both the British and Palestine Sections of the Police. Police should be deployed so no important Jewish settlement or group of Jewish farms was without a detachment of Jewish guards with access to sealed armouries. Each colony should be provided with a telephone and the whole road network improved to give police greater mobility.

As for the CID, Dowbiggin considered too much investigation work was undertaken solely by Palestinian police. He advised that a new head of CID be appointed to restructure the department and create lines of communication from all the districts through to CID HQ and then up to Inspector General himself. From then on the CID became responsible for intelligence gathering and observation of the political activities of all Palestinians not just communists.

Unfortunately the British Government was once again subjecting the Palestine Government to financial cuts, so it was some time before Dowbiggin's suggestions were put into action. The government did provide the sealed armouries but instead of rifles the new armouries consisted of one-shot Greeners. One step the administration took that involved little extra cost was to bar Jabotinsky from returning to Palestine after his visit to South Africa. For the rest of his life Jabotinsky had to administer the Irgun (Haganah Bet) from New York.

On 8th May,1931, Commandant Mavrogordato left the Force to become Inspector General of the Trinidad Constabulary. Alan Saunders became Acting Commandant pending the arrival of R.G.B. Spicer Esq, CMG MC, who had been Commissioner of Police in Kenya.